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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LEE ROY WOOD, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee 
Case No. 20050221-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a district court order dismissing a petition for post-conviction 
relief, which challenged convictions for Aggravated Murder, a capital offense, two counts 
of Attempted Aggravated Murder, first degree felonies, and Aggravated Kidnaping, a first 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(j) (West 2005). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Should petitioner's claims be dismissed because they are inadequately 
briefed? 
Standard of Review: "Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 'may be disregarded 
or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court.5 Utah R. App. P. 24(j)." State v. Gamblin, 
2 0 0 0 U T 4 4 , p , lP.3d!108. 
2 
Issue II: Did the district court properly deny and dismiss the petition for post-
conviction relief? 
Standard of Review: The following standard of review applies: 
Our standard of review for an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for 
post-conviction relief depends on the issue appealed. Though we review the 
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, we will disturb findings of fact 
only if they are clearly erroneous. Further, '"we survey the record in the light 
most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we will not reverse if there 
is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to be convinced 
that the writ should be granted.'" 
Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this appeal: 
Addendum B - Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (Prisoner's demand for disposition). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 10, 2001, petitioner Wood was charged by Information with one count of 
Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder, a capital offense; two counts of Attempted Criminal 
Homicide, Aggravated Murder, first degree felonies; one count of Aggravated Kidnaping, 
a first degree felony; one count of Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony; and one count 
of Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm by Restricted Person, a second degree 
felony. In addition, notice was given that the State intended to seek the firearm sentencing 
enhancement (R. 338-342). 
3 
On August 15, 2001, a telephone conference was held. The prosecutor and counsel 
for Wood asked the court to set the preliminary hearing on December 10th and 11th, 2001. 
The preliminary hearing was set for those dates (R. 335-36). 
On November 28, 2001, petitioner's counsel advised the court that they believed 
Wood needed to have a competency evaluation before proceeding with the preliminary 
hearing (R. 332-33). They therefore requested that the preliminary hearing be continued. 
The preliminary hearing was re-scheduled for January 22, 2002. Id. 
On December 13,2001, the Order granting the petition for competency evaluation was 
filed (R. 329-30). The competency evaluation was not completed in time for the scheduled 
January 22nd preliminary hearing (R. 326-27). The preliminary hearing was re-scheduled for 
April 4-5, 2002. Id. 
On March 8,2002, Wood was found competent (R. 322-24). The preliminary hearing 
was held on April 4, 2002 (R. 316-20). The Court again noted on the record that it found 
Wood to be competent. Id. Wood was bound over for trial (R. 313-14). 
Various motions were filed and addressed. On August 16, 2002, the parties filed a 
written stipulation to change venue (R. 310-11). At a hearing on August 19, 2002, counsel 
for Wood made a motion to vacate the jury trial date because the new venue needed to be 
determined, and also because there was a Bill before the legislature dealing with mental 
health issues, and they wanted the jury trial set after the legislature made a decision as to 
4 
whether or not that Bill would pass (R. 3 07-8). The trial date was continued and Wood stated 
on the record that he waived his right to a speedy trial. Id. 
On August 20, 2002, the parties were notified that if the case were transferred to the 
Fourth District Court in Heber, Utah, it would be March 2003 before the jury trial could be 
set (R. 304-5). Petitioner's counsel stated that Wood had no objection to a March 2003 trial 
setting. Id. The court approved the transfer of the case to Fourth District Court in Heber, 
Utah. Id. However, the case was never actually transferred, because Wood pled guilty. 
On September 19,2002, counsel for Wood withdrew the motion for change of venue 
and also withdrew a motion to suppress (R. 298).1 Wood pled guilty to counts I, II, and III. 
As part of the plea agreement, "the maximum penalty would be life in prison without parole. 
Mr. Wood would concede as part of the plea that was the appropriate sentence." (R. 299). 
Also as part of the plea agreement, the remaining counts would be dismissed (R. 266). 
The Court asked the parties if they would like to discuss Atkins.2 The parties 
indicated that they did not (R. 257-59). Wood waived the time period for sentencing and 
requested that sentencing take place that same day. Id. 
1
 The original transcript of the plea and sentencing hearing on September 19, 2002 
is in the court file in case no. 011800225. The transcript includes conversations which 
the court and parties stated were in chambers and not on the record. Because the State's 
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss would be a public record, only the 
portion of the transcript that was considered "on the record" was included as addendum L 
(R. 274-302). 
2
 Atkins v. Virginia. 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct 2242 (2002). 
5 
On September 19, 2002, shortly after entering his plea, Wood was sentenced to life 
in prison without parole on the Aggravated Murder charge, and five years to life on each of 
the Attempted Aggravated Murder charges. The sentences were to run consecutively (R. 
248-50,252-55 & 287). 
Wood did not file any timely motion to withdraw plea or any timely notice of appeal. 
On December 10,2002, Wood filed a pro se motion to withdraw plea (R 241-46). He filed 
an amended motion to withdraw plea on January 9,2003 (R. 236-39). On January 29,2003, 
the motion to withdraw plea was denied because it was untimely (R. 233-34). Wood 
apparently did not appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw plea. 
On July 16,2003, Wood filed a state petition for post-conviction relief (R. 7-16). On 
April 7, 2004, Wood filed a pro se amended petition for post-conviction relief (R. 88-97). 
In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum (R. 225-369). 
On February 9,2005, the district court entered is ruling, which granted the State's motion to 
dismiss (R. 395-406) (addendum A). ! 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3 
"On 07-06-01 Lee Roy Wood obtained an SKS rifle from the Mike Swett residence 
located at 1757 West 750 North. Lee also met with an individual who will be referred to as 
'K.P.' While at the Swett residence K.P. and Wood began to argue. This argument resulted 
3
 The facts are taken from the probable cause statement (R. 230-31). The facts are 
double spaced for ease of reading. 
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in Wood pointing the SKS rifle at K.P., threatening to kill her, and ordering K.P. to get into 
a truck and drive. 
K.P. did as instructed. K.P. and Wood then traveled West on Highway 40. While 
traveling West on Highway 40 the fight continued and K.P. was physically assaulted by 
Wood. Wood allowed K.P. to stop at the Maverik convenience store to use the restroom. 
Wood followed K.P. into the convenience store and waited near the bathroom door. As K.P. 
exited the restroom, Wood rapidly paid for items purchased, exited the store, and again began 
to verbally abuse K.P. This argument continued, and according to witnesses Wood retrieved 
the SKS rifle from the vehicle and pointed the rifle at K.P. Wood then ordered K.P. back 
into the vehicle to leave the area. 
During the argument Law Enforcement was contacted by a witness. 
K.P. entered the vehicle, backed out of the parking lot onto Union Street, and stopped 
due to the arrival of Police Officers. 
Upon the arrival of Law Enforcement Officers K.P. stopped the vehicle, and Wood 
exited the vehicle from the passenger side door of the truck. Wood retrieved the SKS firearm 
from the vehicle and aimed the rifle at Roosevelt Police Officer Henry McKenna. Wood 
then began pulling the trigger of the rifle attempting to shoot Officer McKenna. Wood then 
realized that the rifle did not have a live round in the chamber. Wood activated the weapon 
and shifted the rifle to his left aiming it at Roosevelt Police Officer Lance Williamson. As 
Wood was aiming the rifle at Williamson, he was verbally challenged by Roosevelt Police 
7 
nimril lln" rilk' >it (liief«iurr and fired a total of live * ?) rounds, one of which struck Chief 
Gurr in the head causing death. Wood then got back into -he passenger side of the truck and 
ordered K.P. to drive due to the fact that he i tad just shot a police officer 
As k.I". wdii diivmjj, Vw;\( mi i 11illiw*t\ III ^ Il na-i piunling i)\c ullr il Imci 
V« rood sat the rifle on the seat, K.P seized the opportunity to grab the rifle and throw it out 
the window. i;iw suspect vehicle was stopped b\ Roosevelt Police Officers near 350 East 
400 North in Roosevelt Citv nnd Lcc f« »• -w us tukch ndo cust v^ viv. wnue ai 
locatk i . . • " . - v > • • [ urt'iccr McKnii 
:'. *fPivr *' u h.- -iM.vr ^-edio murder, aiidiliui lie hoped the Officer he'd shot would 
die. 
It should be noted that Lee Roy Vv ood is current!} * a\ i v.-a,.; ui i a or^aon. .->;„u . ... le, 
and is a com icled bJuii nliut HIIIIHI possess a lire 
SUMMARY OF TEE ARGUMENT 
Petitioner's claims should be dismissed because they are inadequately briefed. 
Petitioner does not appropriate u u m j a uic dui^i .. , 
attempts to raise • the sa i ne argi lment he raised in his petition for post-conviction relief 
Rather than provide meaningful legal analysis, petitioner merely asserts facts and opinions 
that he believes support his claim and concludes that he is entitled to relief This does not 
conform, to the requirements of the briefing i ule. 
8 
Even if petitioner's brief is not dismissed for inadequacy, the decision of the district 
court should be affirmed because the petition for post-conviction relief was properly denied 
and dismissed. The district court ruled correctly that there was good cause for failing to 
bring the matter to trial within 120 days (addendum A). In the alternative, the decision of the 
district court should be affirmed because petitioner waived any claim concerning 120-day 
disposition by entering his guilty plea without raising the issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER'S CLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE 
IT IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED. 
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. However, 
in his appellate brief, petitioner simply raises one of the arguments he raised in his post-
conviction petition. Petitioner does not challenge the decision of the district court. He has 
not argued or established that any of the court's findings were clearly erroneous, or that its 
conclusions of law were incorrect. Rather than provide meaningful legal analysis, petitioner 
merely asserts facts and opinions that he believes support his claim, and then concludes that 
he is entitled to relief. This does not conform to the requirements of the briefing rule. 
Inadequate Briefing. Rule 24 (a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires 
an appellant to include his "contentions and reasons... with respect to the issues presented," 
including "citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." This Court 
9 
• ' r e - .. - : - ' \ ' ' • : X;/< . . 10 II, ril" 
T - " ^ i r . J d 1108 (refusingiO consider nrr>:ment whichi&iikuk* " ' v u — v V ' MacKay 
v Hiinfw ^ 3 P : J ^ \ -U-7-48 (TJlar 
Utah courts have consi^icini) i iuu uiai issues not properly briefed should not be 
court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited. '" State v. 
Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,130 (Utah App. 1997) (citingState v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 
error by the district court. It does not cite to the record; nor does it cite applicable authority. 
It also does not provide any meaningful legal analysis. See State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 
,: UA. \pp . vw:. • /,. .. . . ,,ur-<itlr\ \A i w : l a i i A p p . 1995). 
petition for post-conviction relief should be overturned on appeal. Sec Utah R. .'i ^ \\ 
24(a)(9) (providing that argument section of appellant's brief must "contain the contentions 
a iici reasons - i :.... jppciiai.i •-. Ah respect to the issues presented with citations to the 
i iic bla ic c^kiu v\ i^ Uj-v. I'i-w..^  liiuSt be cujiMi'ueu iiDtriaiiv. )ct \hnl 
<
 4 '•:.-•. 179F.R.D.6(N. 61'Ju.- . .. •!..:.-icyv.StateofNM, 113 F.3d 1170. I P : 
(10th Cir. 1997). HOV\CN .T, pro se litigants must still comply with minimal standards. Id. 
If errors alleged in the pro se brief, even if properly presented, would not amount to 
reversible error, they do not require full analysis. See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 55 
(Utah 1993). 
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authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); see also State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 305 (Utah 1998) (holding that "rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority 
but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority5'); State v. 
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989) (holding that brief "must contain some support for 
each contention"). 
In sum, this Court is not "'a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research.'" State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404,410 (Utah 1999) (quoting 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)), and see Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. 
Accordingly, petitioner's claim should be rejected. See Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 410 (refusing to 
consider appellant's claim due to the lack of meaningful analysis of cited authority); 
Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (refusing to address claim on appeal where petitioner's brief 
"wholly [lacked] legal analysis and authority to support his argument"); State v. Bryant, 965 
P.2d 539, 548-49 (Utah App. 1998) (same); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 
1992) (same). 
Failure to Marshal. Petitioner's claim also fails because his grounds for relief 
ignore the district court's findings and conclusions in support of its rulings (R. 395-406) 
(Addenda A). The law is well-settled that although the Court of Appeals will "review the 
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, [it] will disturb findings of fact only if they 
are clearly erroneous. Further, "'we survey the record in the light most favorable to the 
findings and judgment; and we will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to 
11 
suppo \ ' . . :i(!" i I lafthe i i s 
! > ' , , : o ' > * • • ; ' « ' "' r t a h A p r - *•* * :." * " ' . 
A court's findings are "clearly erroneous only if they 'are against the clear weight of 
the evidence'" or if the reviewing court, '"reaches a definite and, firm,, conviction,'" that they 
P 2d 191, , 193 ( [ Ita h 1 98 ) )) 1 1 le bi irden is on the petitioner to marshal all of the evidence 
in support of the district court's findings and then to demonstrate that the evidence does not 
si ipportthe findings. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, A+6P *1 (Utah 1994). If the petitioner 
makes no a ttemptt : marshal thee i< idence si ip.*-- ... ... • . . • • : . 
its insufficiency, this Court "accept[s] the 'trial court's findings as stated in its ruling oiuit 
v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1,999). 
Petitioner iaij> to carry his burden, llcrclci^oiilv iw iacts or events which he relieves 
oil in-: he is entitled to relief. Because petitioner has failed to marshal the support ir :^ 
evidence and demonstrate its insufficiency, this Court should, accept the district court.'s 
iiiiuiriL:^ . lienvenuto, 983 I \2d at 5.58. . _ . 
supporting the district court's findings, nor demonstrates its inadequacy Therefore, this 
Court should decline to consider petitioner's challenge to (he district court.'s ruling 
uismissingivr; ;X.;K;OII I J\ post-eon\ laion IC.^L :.CL ^;i.*..^i<.,: i .;<. ,,. i:.u . > 
12 
789, 800 (Utah 1991) (failure to marshal evidence); Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 410 (failure to 
meaningfully analyze claims). 
II. THE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WAS 
PROPERLY DISMISSED. 
Even if this Court were to excuse the failures of petitioner' s brief, review of the action 
below nevertheless establishes that the petition for post-conviction relief was properly 
dismissed.5 
A. Although the post-conviction court reached the 
merits, this Court should affirm on the alternative 
basis that petitioner waived his claim concerning 120-
day disposition by pleading guilty. 
The post-conviction court reached the merits of the 120-day disposition issue before 
dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. However, "[i]t is well settled that an 
appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that 
stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling.5" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^ [10, 52 
P.3d 1158 (quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, \ 18, 29 P.3d 1225. 
The only issue petitioner raises on appeal is that his case was not brought to trial 
within 120 days. However, his case never went to trial. Instead, petitioner chose to enter a 
guilty plea, without raising any claim concerning his request for 120-day disposition. 
5
 The post-conviction court ruled on several other issues that petitioner has not 
raised on appeal. Therefore, they are not at issue in this appeal. 
13 
petitioner was nut eiiuheu iu pusl-conviction reif * K ;ir.^  / .:\r: 
concerning 120-day disposition by entering 'his guilty plea ^R. }5$«59). The dismissal of the 
petition for post-conviaiun renci MIUUUI IK aI"firmed on this alternative basis. 
jurisdictional defects, including pre -plea constitutional violations. See State v. Parson-'. "^ * 
P . 2 d l 2 7 5 '< 27$ <\:Vdh\W9): State v.Serv 0 8 V 2d 9 3 5 ^ 3 8 (I tah Apr '>SN- f he 120-
day disposition run. i* nui jui I>UICIIOIJ.U IJ» i au . u i> not ~vcn 3 constitutional right It is a 
' * *
 :
" ,
 l
 ; -. • • u;*.-.". B) I herefoi e, 
entry of a ^ril tv plea waived any allegation of violauon ui the 120-dav disposition statute. 
t V voluntary guilty plea constitutes an admission of the elements of the offense. See 
McCarthy united States', J v -• - . * u^ura. Maaza* . arUi-n. 852P .2d 
988, i 
criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court thai he is 111 fact iMiiln . >i Uic offense 
charged, he nia-- \/A thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation ^ 
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entv) o i ihe guilty plea." 1 bllett v. Henderson, 
I 1 1 [ ) S 258. 26 7 93 S CI 1602, 36 I , Ed 2d 235 (1/973), 
By entering his guilty plea, petitioner Wood waived any claim concerning alleged 
violations of his request for 120-day disposition, The fact that he was waiving his rights by 
14 
pleading guilty was clearly explained to him. At the time of entry of his guilty plea, the 
following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: You give up your right to appeal on any claim of 
evidence gathered in violation of your constitutional rights. Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that if evidence was gathered in 
violation of your constitutional rights, that evidence would be suppressed and 
not be available to the prosecution at the time of trial? Do you understand 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: So when I tell you you give up your right to appeal on 
that basis, you give up the right to challenge the evidence in violation of your 
constitutional rights. Do you understand that, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
* * * 
THE COURT: I want to point out at this time your limited basis for 
appeal at this point. Because there isn't any trial, there aren't any issues you 
could appeal, which may have arisen at the time of the trial. Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I made it clear, you give up your right to an appeal based 
upon the ruling of the court, and based upon any violation of constitutional 
rights. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
15 
ill; CAJ \ ' i u f ; ij^j) uu give u^p your rights with respect to the issue of 
..j\,ression iK*H -^ J i<ih- t4ith? because that's been withdrawn Do yoi i 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
(R. 294-95). 
I he issue after a defendant pleads guilty is not the merits of any possible pre-plea 
claims, hul whefhci (lie guilty pirn wns mink iiitcllisenllv .111 nl \ nhiiilanh HI in I \M(II Ihr.ulv ii v 
of competent counsel. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 265. aA counseled plea of guilty is an admission 
of factual guilt so reliable that, whci e '- >. luntary and intelligent it c\\x\\c \ ahdly removes the 
i . . . . . . . . . _ ^ , , la.uiu. ^u,,; ; a ^ai;^ >wiH Dasis for the 
Sta'c" • '^ v~ ^:v* ' - . *• "• * 5 • i^ .--fm - - •• -cNdiillh 
constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with die \aliu establishment of factual 
guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established " 
/I fennt 1 1 • /V e 1 v 1 01 k, 423 1 I S 1 51 , n.2, < »6 S C 1 2 41, 1 61 Ed 2d'1 95(19 J 5). . 
By entering his guilty plea, petitioner Wood wai v edallnon
 : ji irisdictional defects 
therefore wraived any allegations concerning 120-day disposition. He therefore was not 
entiiku to post-conviction relief based on any allegations concerning 120-day disposition. 
pOSt-conviction relief. 
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B. Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on his 
allegations concerning 120-day disposition. 
Even if petitioner had not waived his claim concerning 120-day disposition, he was 
still not entitled to post-conviction relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that the district "court 
misunderstood the whole 120 day issue." (pet.'s brief at 1). He claims that he "[pjlainly 
stated that it was the Utah State Prison's Agent that misfiled the 120 day disposition, not the 
county attorney office or the court." Id. Petitioner then broadly asserts that because the 
"agent Plaintiff failed to file the 120 day disposition" he "believes he is entitled to relief." 
Id. at 3. 
However, petitioner ignores or perhaps misinterprets the district court's ruling on this 
issue. The district court noted that "the Notice which Petitioner claims he filed at the prison 
was not filed with the Court; nor was the Court informed that a Notice had been filed. 
Therefore, the criminal case proceeded without any consideration of the unlawful detainer 
statute. Because Petitioner did not file a Motion to Dismiss, the State was similarly not 
aware of the filing of the Notice. Consequently, the State was not given an opportunity to 
request that the trial be held within the statutory period." (R. 404). 
Nevertheless, for purposes of the State's motion to dismiss, the district court assumed 
that petitioner filed his 120-day disposition notice with the prison on 7/20/01, that he 
requested his counsel to file a motion to dismiss, and that counsel failed to file a motion to 
dismiss (R. 404). The district court therefore analyzed the issue as if the request for 120-day 
disposition had been properly filed. The district court determined that even if the request for 
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1 W-d/iv disposihon haul been properly filed on llic dale pi fidonu ,(lieges he g a u (lie notice 
to the prison, petitioner would not be entitled to relief, 
The district court went through a lengthy review where it set out the matters that 
occurred in the criminal case from the time that petitioner alleges he filed his notice for 120-
ilay disposition until he enlereil Ins innll\ plea (K. \{H> --III I addendum A). I he district court 
discussed continuances and the reasons forthoseeonliniiaiu'es fhr request ioi a eoinpelen •> 
evaluation; the designation of expert witnesses; motion to retain Dan Jones to conduct a 
survey; and numerous other motions such as motion to quash the bindover, motion to exclude 
(
-
 ;
' - .. ogardmg ucath 
qualification of the •••'*. niotiun to bifurcate couiu bi • •* •• * pholojvaphs, 
motion to exclude bad acts, and motion for jury view of scene. In addition, defense counsel 
requested a moL.^i ,» * change of venue and defense counsel told the court he had no 
ohjtvlioii In ,i Mnn I'm V)l) \ (rial I! i%- KM. addendum / I . : '" 
rhe statute provides that even after a written demand I <j :"*^ " r -
delivered as required, the parties "for good cause shown ., . .may be granted any reasonable 
i'onliiiuance.n Utah l 'ode Ann. ij / / ^ M ( J ) , I'ol lowing its lengthy review, the district court 
determined that if I he lime periods lor n i l a inn i, i mil nuances were e\ rinded, ml u\\ \ mid i edut e 
the time below the 120 day threshold." (R. 598). 
The statute also provides that if the court finds that the failure to have the matter heard 
v\ ilhin llic lime required "is not suppo:^. . . . ; , ^ *.*« .u l t -^  Mi«m o,der ihe matter dismissed. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). The district court determined that even assuming the matter 
was not heard within 120 days, there was "good cause" for failing to bring the matter to trial 
within 120 days (R. 396-98). 
Finally, the district court also concluded that counsel was not ineffective for failing 
to file a motion to dismiss (R. 396). 
To be entitled to relief on appeal, petitioner must establish that the district court's 
findings of fact are clearly erroneous, or that its conclusions of law are incorrect. Petitioner 
has failed to meet this burden. Petitioner has failed to establish that the ruling by the district 
court was incorrect. Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of the 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments set forth above, the State asks this Court to affirm the district 
court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <?(l day of September, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ERIN RILEY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Z\ day of September 2005,1 mailed, postage prepaid, 
two accurate copies of the foregoing Respondent/Appellee's Brief to: 
Lee Roy Wood, #18439 
Central Utah Correctional Facility 
PO BOX 550 
Gunnison, UT 84634 
Petitioner/Appellant pro se 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
LEE ROY WOOD, : RULING UINTASCSK^OJAH 
Petitioner, : FEB 0 9 2005 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
VS. :
 Bv ^ J DEPUTY 
STATE OF UTAH, : Case No.: 030800480 
Respondent : 
This matter comes before the Court on the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Previously 
Judge Anderson has ruled upon the Petitioner's Claim that Counsel was ineffective in not filing 
an appeal when the Court did not recuse itself on its own motion. The initial Petition also raised 
issues as to whether the Petitioner entered his plea voluntarily and whether the Petitioner's 
counsel was ineffective in failing to inform him of the decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U S. 
304 (2002). The Amended Petition raised additional issues as to whether Petitioner's trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Motion to Dismiss under 77-29-1; (The State 
unlawful detainer statute). There is also some language which indicates that the Petitioner claims 
that his Constitutional Right to a speedy trial was violated. There are, therefore, four issues 
currently before the Court. In his Amended Petition the Petitioner lists grounds (a) through (k) as 
grounds for relief. Except for the two issues identified in the foregoing paragraph, the Petitioner 
has not provided any allegations, legal analysis, evidence, or case law to support his allegations 
in the Amended Complaint. Furthermore, as Respondent argues, the Petitioner's guilty plea 
effectively waived all non-jurisdictional pre-plea defects, including pre-plea constitutional 
violations.1 Therefore, all claims in the Amended Complaint except the issues relating to speedy 
trial are dismissed. 
1. Plea Entered Unlawfully and Involuntarily 
As stated above, the Petitioner claims he entered his guilty plea in order to avoid the 
death penalty The Petitioner further claims that he is mentally retarded and would not be subject 
to the death penalty pursuant to the Atkins decision. Petitioner argues that, had he been made 
aware of Atkins and its implications, he would not have entered the guilty plea. 
*See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 938 
(UtahApp. 1988) 
1 
The Petitioner has not provided any evidence that indicates he qualifies as mentally 
retarded pursuant to Atkins. In Atkins, the Supreme Court stated, t,cMild' mental retardation is 
typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70.M (quoting the 
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic,and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41, 42-
43 (4th ed. 2000)). Id. at 309 n.3). The only evidence before the Court regarding the Petitioner's 
IQ level is that provided by Dr. Eric Neilson. Dr. Neilson reports that the Petitioner "was 
administered the Shipley Institute of Living Scale. He generated an estimated IQ of 81 which 
would place him in the low average range." The Petitioner has not provided any other evidence 
to show that he is mentally retarded and would not be subject to the death penalty pursuant to 
Atkins. Therefore, the Petitioner's argument that he entered the guilty plea to avoid a punishment 
that he was not subject to (the death penalty) fails. 
Pursuant to Atkins, Utah has enacted UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-101, which, consistent 
with Atkins, provides that a defendant who is found to be mentally retarded is not subject to the 
death penalty. Furthermore, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-102 provides a defendant is mentally 
retarded if: 
(1) the defendant has significant sub-average general intellectual functioning that 
results in and exists concurrently with significant deficiencies in adaptive 
functioning that exist primarily in the areas of reasoning or impulse control, or in 
both of these areas; and 
(2) the sub-average general intellectual functioning and the significant 
deficiencies in adaptive functioning under Subsection (1) are both manifested 
prior to age 22. 
Again, there are no facts before the Court which would show the Petitioner qualifies as mentally 
retarded pursuant to this statute. The only facts before the Court regarding this issue are those 
found in Dr. Eric Neilson and Dr. John Maloufs reports, which do not conclude the Petitioner is 
mentally retarded. Additionally, the Petitioner does not argue that the statute does not comply 
with Atkins. Based upon these facts, the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is Granted as to this 
issue, 
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - (Atkins) 
The Petitioner argues counsel did not inform him regarding the Atkins decision. 
Petitioner claims that he would not have entered his plea if he had been made aware of the 
implications of that decision. 
To meet his burden with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel, the Petitioner must 
show that his attorney's performance was deficient through an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and the deficient performance prejudiced his case. The mere bald allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel are not sufficient to support this ground for relief. Again, 
Petitioner has not provided any evidence or alleged facts which would implicate the State statute 
2 
(77-15a-102) or Atkins. Therefore, it can not be said that counsel's performance was deficient 
for failure to inform the Petitioner regarding Atkins as he is not an individual within the 
protection of Atkins. Petitioner's trial counsel was clearly aware of Atkins and its potential 
implications in this matter. During the plea hearing the Court and defense counsel specifically 
discussed Atkins and its potential implications. However, defense counsel ultimately stated, 
"There's nothing in that case that precludes what were about to do." As previously stated, the 
only evidence before the Court regarding the Petitioner's status as mentally retarded is provided 
in the psychological evaluations of Dr. Malouf and Dr. Neilson, which do not establish the 
Petitioner as mentally retarded under Atkins or 77-15a-102. This claim fails and the Motion to 
Dismiss is granted as to this issue. 
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (120 day detainer - 77-29-1): 
The Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to file a Motion to Dismiss 
under the unlawful detainer statute (77-29-1). In support of this claim, the Petitioner alleges: (1) 
He filed Notice with the State Prison on 7/20/01; (2) After 120 days had elapsed (and prior to his 
plea) he requested counsel to file a Motion to Dismiss; and (3) Counsel failed to file a Motion to 
Dismiss. While there may well be contested issues of fact as to whether an appropriate notice 
was filed and/or whether the Petitioner asked counsel to file a Motion to Dismiss; for the 
purposes of this Motion the Court will assume these as facts proved. A review of the record 
shows that the Petitioner did not file a Motion to Dismiss. 
With respect to this issue the Court will note that the Notice which Petitioner claims he 
filed at the prison was not filed with the Court; nor was the Court informed that a Notice had 
been filed. Therefore, the criminal case proceeded without any consideration of the unlawful 
detainer statute. Because Petitioner did not file a Motion to Dismiss, the State was similarly not 
aware of the filing of the Notice. Consequently, the State was not given an opportunity to 
request that the trial be held within the statutory period. 
It will also be useful to consider the statute itself. The statute (77-29-1) is not implicated 
until: (1) A Defendant files an appropriate notice; (2) The trial is not held within 120 days; (3) 
The Defendant files a Motion to Dismiss; (4) The Trial Court reviews the record and finds that 
the failure to hold the trial within 120 days was not supported by good cause. The Defendant has 
the burden to prove a notice was properly filed. The statute allows for "Reasonable 
continuances" for "good cause". (77-29-1(3)) However, the statute requires that the continuances 
be approved "...in open Court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present." The burden to 
prove that a continuance was approved pursuant to subsection (3) rests with the State, Even 
where the 120 day period has elapsed the case may be dismissed only (1) When the Defendant 
files a Motion to Dismiss for failure to bring the matter to trial within 120 days and (2) The Trial 
Court reviews the record and finds "...that the failure of the prosecutor to have the matter heard 
within the time is not supported by good cause." (77-29-1(4)). Good cause under subsection (4) 
exists whenever delay is wholly attributable to the Defendant State v. Heatou 958 P.2d 115 
(Utah 1982); State v. Valesquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982); State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551 (Utah 
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1991). The State bears the burden of showing that there was good cause for failing to bring the 
matter to trial within 120 days. 
The issue before the court is whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a 
Motion to dismiss. Because the Petitioner did -not file a Motion to Dismiss, he does not (at this 
time) argue that he is entitled to dismissal by reason of the operation of the statute. Instead, 
Petitioner seeks to have his plea set aside based upon his claim that counsel was ineffective. 
With respect to the issue of ineffective assistance, the Petitioner bears the burden to prove that 
his attorney's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
Petitioner. In considering these issues it will be helpful to establish a time line relating to the 
running of the 120 day period. 
1. July 20, 2001. Petitioner filed his Notice for 120 day disposition with the Warden 
at the Utah State Prison. 
2. August 15, 2001. Defense Counsel had been tentatively selected but had not been 
formally appointed pursuant to Rule 8 U.R.Cr.P. Counsel stipulated to setting the Preliminary 
Hearing on December 10th and 11th, 2001. Elapsed time from paragraph 1 above (7-20-01 to 
8-15-01) 26 days. 
3. September 11, 2001. Court conducted a Rule 8 (U.R.Cr.P.) hearing and formally 
appointed defense counsel (Mr. Brass and Mr. Bugden). The parties stipulated to a trial date 
of 9/20/2002. Elapsed time from paragraph 2 above (8-15-01 to 9-11-01) 27 days. 
4. November 28, 2001. Defense Counsel requested a competency evaluation. Elapsed 
time from paragraph 3 above (9-11-01 to 11-28-01) 78 days. Defense Counsel requested that 
the Preliminary Hearing be delayed until after there was a determination of competency. 
Preliminary Hearing was rescheduled for 1/22/02. 
5. December 10, 2001. Defense Counsel indicated that he may not be able to 
designate experts until 3-15-02. The court ordered that the parties make an initial designation 
of expert witnesses by 4-15-02 and designate additional expert witnesses by 5-6-02. Elapsed 
time from paragraph 4 above (11-28-01 to 12-10-01) 12 days. 
6. January 15, 2002. Defense Counsel informed the Court that the competency 
evaluation would not be ready by January 22, 2002 (which was the Preliminary Hearing date). 
January 22, 2002 was selected as the time to reschedule the competency hearing and 
Preliminary Hearing. Elapsed time from paragraph 5 above (12-10-01 to 1-15-02) 36 days, 
7. January 22, 2002. The competency evaluation had not been completed. The 
competency hearing was therefore continued to April 4th and 5th, 2002 with the Preliminary 
Hearing to follow. Elapsed time from paragraph 6 above (1-15-02 to 1-22-02) 7 days. 
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8. February 13, 2002. Counsel for Petitioner informed the Court that the competency 
issue would be submitted based upon die written evaluations and that no witness would be 
called on the issue of competency. Elapsed time from paragraph 7 above (1-22-02 to 2-13-
2002) 22 days. 
9. March 8, 2002. Upon review of the competency evaluations the Court made an 
initial finding that the Petitioner was competent to proceed. This finding was subject to the 
Court receiving and reviewing the curricular vitae of the examiners. The competency issue 
was continued until April 4, 2002. Elapsed time from paragraph 8 above (2-13-02 to 3-8-02) 
23 days. 
10. April 4, 2002. After reviewing the curriculum vitae of each examiner and the 
competency evaluation, the Court made a final finding the Petitioner competent. The 
Preliminary Hearing was held. Probable Cause was found and the matter was bound over. 
Elapsed time from paragraph 9 above (3-8-02 to 4-4-02) 27 days. 
11. April 12, 2002, Petitioner filed a Motion to Retain Dan Jones and Associates to 
conduct a survey regarding the likelihood of seating a fair and impartial jury hi Uintah 
County, Elapsed time from paragraph 10 above (4-4-02 to 4-12-02) 8 days. 
12. April 26, 2002. The State filed its Opposition to the Motion to Retain Dan Jones 
and Associates. Elapsed time from paragraph 11 above (4-12-02 to 4-26-02) 14 days. 
13. April 29, 2002. In a telephone conference, the Court set oral arguments on the 
Motion to Retain Dan Jones and Associates for June 7, 2002. Elapsed time from paragraph 12 
above (4-26-02 to 4-29-02) 3 days. 
14. May 13, 2002. Petitioner filed Multiple Motions which the Court was required to 
rule upon prior to trial These Motions included; (1) Motion to Quash the Bindover; (2) 
Motion to Exclude Victim Impact Evidence; (3) Motion to Strike die Death Penalty; (4) 
Motion Regarding Death Qualification of the Jury; (5) Motion to Bifurcate Count Six; (6) 
Motion to Exclude Photographs; (7) Motion to Exclude Bad Acts; (8) Motion for Jury View of 
the Shooting Scene; and (9) Motion to View Shooting Scene, Uintah County Jail and Utah 
State Prison. Prior to this time the Court had designated July 8, 2002 as the date for oral 
argument on pending motions. Elapsed time from paragraph 13 above (4-29-02 to 5-13-02) 14 
days. 
15. May 15, 2002. Petitioner filed two Motions: (1) Motion to Suppress Defendant's 
statement to Police and (2) Motion for Change of Venue. The Court had previously 
designated July 8, 2002 as the time for oral argument on pending Motions. Elapsed time from 
paragraph 14 above (5-13-02 to 5-15-02) 2 days. 
16. June 7, 2002. The Court heard oral argument on the Motion to Retain Dan Jones 
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to Conduct a Poll. The Motion was granted. Defense Counsel requested that the Motion for 
Change of Venue not be considered on July 8, 2002. Defense Counsel requested that the 
hearing on the Motion be conducted after the poll was concluded and the issue briefed. The 
Motion for Change of Venue was scheduled for hearing on August 19, 2002. Elapsed time 
from paragraph 15 above (5-15-02 to 6-7-02)23 days. 
17. June 20, 2002. The United States Supreme Court published its opinion in Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, holding that certain "retarded" defendants are not subject to the 
death penalty under the Eight amendment, The Supreme Court stated that ""mild" mental 
retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70." 
18. July 8, 2002. The Court heard oral argument on all pending motions. However, 
Defense Counsel indicated that he was awaiting review of exhibits on two pending motions (#6 
and #7) and was not then able to designate which exhibits he objected to. The Court took 
these motions under advisement. The Court ruled upon remaining motions, except the Motion 
to Suppress, which was taken under advisement, and the Motion for Change of Venue which 
had previously been re-set for hearing on August 19, 2002. Elapsed time from paragraph 16 
above (6-7-02 to 7-8-0) 31 days. 
19. August 19, 2002. This hearing had been scheduled to hear evidence on the 
Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue. At the hearing, the parties stipulated to a change 
of venue. Defense Counsel made a Motion to Vacate the September 20, 2002 trial date. The 
Court granted this Motion. Although the parties had stipulated to a change of venue, they had 
not agreed where the trial would be held. The parties also stipulated that the Court rule on the 
pending Motion to Suppress. Defense Counsel noted that there was a bill pending hi a special 
session of the legislation to address the issues raised in Atkins. Defense Counsel asked the 
Court to not schedule the trial until after the legislation was passed (which did not occur until 
the regular session which began in January, 2003). Defendant Counsel also raised the 
possibility of a hearing regarding mental retardation and an inter locator y appeal. Defendant 
specifically waived his right to a speedy trial. Elapsed time from paragraph 18 above (7-8-02 
to 8-19-02) 42 days. 
20. August 20, 2002. In a telephone conference (which was not on the record) the 
Court informed the parties that the Administrative Office of the Court had notified the Court 
that, if the case was transferred to the 4th District, it could not be scheduled for trial until 
March of 2003. Defense Counsel indicated that he had no objections to a March trial and 
stipulated to transferring the case to Heber. Elapsed time from paragraph 19 above (8-19-02 
to 8-20-02) 1 day. 
21. September 19, 2002. (Sometime prior to this date the parties had indicated that 
they had reached a plea agreement which would resolve the case without trial). The parties 
indicated that because there was no longer an issue of seating an impartial jury, Defendant 
would withdraw his Motion to Change Venue'. Defendant withdrew his Motion to Change 
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Venue and his Motion to Suppress; and entered into a plea which resolved all charges before 
the Court. Elapsed time from paragraph 20 above (8-20-02 to 9-19-02) 30 days. 
22. The total time between the date Notice was filed (7-20-02) and the date of the plea 
was 426 days: 
Paragraph 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Elapsed Days 
Q 
26 
27 
78 
12 
36 
7 
22 
23 
27 
8 
14 
3 
14 
2 
23 
0 
31 
42 
1 
30 
426 
Several periods of time are tolled pursuant to the operation of subsection (4) of the 
statute as delays which were attributable to Petitioner: 
(1) Mr. Wood engaged in conduct while incarcerated after his arrest which raised 
issues as to whether he was competent to proceed. Counsel for Petitioner made a Motion for a 
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competency evaluation on November 28, 2001. The State stipulated to an evaluation and the 
Court ordered an evaluation. On April 4, 2002 the Court found that Petitioner was competent. 
After the parties stipulated to an evaluation, no hearings could be held until after a finding of 
competency. The court finds that the delay associated with the determination of competency 
was for "good cause" under 77-29-1(4). Therefore, the period between November 28, 2001 
and April 4, 2002 (127 days) will not be included for the purpose of computing the 120 day 
period. 
(2) On April 12, 2002, Counsel for Petitioner filed a Motion to Retain Dan Jones and 
Associates to conduct a survey concerning whether an unbiased jury could be seated in Uintah 
County. This Motion was filed to allow the Defendant to develop evidence in support of his 
Motion to Change Venue. This Motion was granted at a hearing which was held on June 7, 
2002. This delay of 56 days (April 12, 2002 to June 7, 2002) was attributable to the 
Defendant. The Court finds this delay to be for "good cause" under 77-29-1(4). This period 
of time will not be considered in computing the 120 day period. 
(3) On May 13, 2002 the Petitioner filed various motions which required a ruling by 
the Court prior to trial. Most of these motions were ruled upon at the July 8, 2002 hearing. 
However, the Petitioner asked the Court for additional time to designate certain evidence 
which he sought to exclude from the jury (Motions #6 and #7). The Petitioner never 
designated the evidence which he sought to exclude; so these motions were still pending when 
the plea was entered on September 19, 2002. The delay between May 13, 2002 and 
September 19, 2002 (129 days) was therefore caused by the filing of the various motions listed 
in paragraph 14 above. The delay was for "good cause" under 77-29-1(4). This period of 
time will not be included in computing the 120 day period. 
(4) On May 15, 2002, the Petitioner filed a Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statements 
to Police. Oral argument on this motion was presented on July 8, 2002 and the Court took the 
issue under advisement. The Court had prepared a written Ruling on this Motion but the 
Petitioner withdrew the Motion at his plea hearing on September 19, 2002 prior to the Court 
entering its Ruling. The delay between May 15, 2002 and September 19, 2002 (127 days) was 
therefore caused by the filing of the Motion to Suppress. This was a delay for "good cause" 
under 77-29-1(4). This period of time will not be included in computing the 120 day period. 
(5) On May 15, 2002 the Petitioner filed his Motion for Change of Venue. This issue 
was set for an evidentiary hearing on August 19, 2002. At that hearing the parties stipulated 
that the motion should be granted. Defense Counsel made a Motion to Vacate the September 
20, 2002 trial date. The delay between May 15, 2002 and August 19, 2002 (96 days) was 
caused by the filing of the Motion to Change Venue. The delay was for "good cause" under 
77-29-1(4). This period of time will not be included in computing the 120 day period. 
With respect to the 426 days between the date that the Notice was filed (7-20-01) and 
the date the plea was entered (9-19-02) the Court has found good cause under 77-29-1(4) for 
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all periods of time except: 
1. From the date the Notice was filed (7/20/01) to the date the parties agreed 
upon a Preliminary Hearing date (8/15/01) - 26 days. 
2. From the date the parties agreed upon a Preliminary Hearing date (8/15/01) 
to the date defense counsel was appointed (9/11/01) - 27 days. 
3. From the date defense counsel was appointed (9/11/01) to the date the 
Petitioner filed his Motion for a Competency evaluation (11/28/01) -78 days . 
4. From the date that the Preliminary Hearing was held (4/4/02) to the date the 
Petitioner filed his Motion for a Survey regarding jury bias (4/12/02) - 8 days. 
5. Total time: 1) 26 days 
2) 27 days 
3) 78 days 
4) 8 davs 
139 days 
On August 15, 2001 the parties stipulated that the Preliminary Hearing should be held 
on December 10, 2002. On November 28, 2001 the Petitioner requested a competency 
evaluation which tolled the running of the 120 day period. There are 105 days (8-15-01 to 11-
28-01) which may be tolled based on subsection (3) (which excludes certain continuances). 
The record does not reflect the factors which caused counsel to agree upon the December 10 
Preliminary Hearing date. Because no notice under the unlawful detainer statute had been 
provided to the Court or counsel for the State; there was no reason to make a record 
concerning this issue or to obtain a ruling as to whether some or all of this period of time 
should be excluded under subsection (3). Although the State may claim that some or all of this 
time period should be excluded under subsection (3), for the purpose of this Motion the Court 
will include the period from 8-15-01 to 11-28-01 in computing the 120 day period. One 
hundred and thirty one (131) of the 139 days occurred from the time of the filing of the Notice 
(7-20-02) to the time the Motion for a Competency hearing was filed (11/28/01). Defense 
counsel was not even "tentatively" appointed until 8/15/01. If the Court merely excluded the 
time prior to the "tentative" appointment of counsel (7/20/01 to 8/15/01) 26 days would be 
excluded. This would reduce the time below the 120 day threshold. 
Nevertheless, even assuming that the 120 day period has ran, the statute (77-29-1 (4)) 
requires the Court to examine the record to see whether there was "good cause" for the 
prosecutors failure to bring the matter to trial within 120 days. As will be more fully 
discussed below, even assuming that 139 days had elapsed, there was "good cause" under 77-
29-1 (4) for failing to bring this matter to trial within 120 days. 
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In determining whether "good cause" exists under subsection (4) the Court must 
"review the proceeding" and determine whether the failure to bring the matter to trial within 
120 days is "supported by good cause". In this case, the following facts are relevant to the 
issue of good cause under subsection (4): 
1. Neither the State nor the Court was aware that a 120 day Notice had been filed. It 
is clear that the 120 day period begins to run when the Notice is filed. For purpose of 
computing the 120 day period it is therefore not relevant that the State and the Court had not 
been informed of the filing of the Notice. Nevertheless, in considering whether there was 
"good cause" for the prosecutor's failure to bring the matter to trial within 120 days it is 
certainly relevant that the prosecutor was not aware of the filing of the Notice. Without 
notice, neither the prosecutor nor the Court was provided with a motive to provide a trial date 
within 120 days. 
2. Delay in the Appointment of Defense Counsel. As indicated, 426 days elapsed 
between the filing of the Notice (7-20-10) and the plea (9-19-02) Two hundred eighty seven 
(287) of the 426 days have been tolled based on delays attributable to the Petitioner. 
Therefore, 139 days elapsed prior to the plea. Twenty six of those days elapsed prior to the 
time that counsel was tentatively appointed (7-20-01 to 8-15-01). Another 27 days elapsed 
prior to the time counsel was formally appointed (8-15-01 to 9-11-01). Even assuming that 
counsel was fully functioning when "tentatively" appointed on 8/15/01, 26 days were lost 
while counsel was selected and appointed. The procedural process required for appointment of 
attorneys in capital cases is unique in criminal law. (See Rule 8 U.R.Cr.P.). Two attorneys 
must be appointed. Each must be qualified under the Rule to represent capital defendants. 
The Trial Court is required to review the attorney's qualification to ensure that they each meet 
Rule 8 requirements. As in this case, capital offenses are often not included in the contracts of 
local legal defenders. (Local public defenders were not qualified to represent capital 
defendants under Rule 8). This necessitates a certain amount of time to solicit and award 
contracts with Rule 8 qualified counsel, As slated, even after a contract is entered into, the 
Court must review counsel's qualifications. This takes additional time. For purposes of this 
analysis 26 days was not an unreasonable period of time to solicit, appoint, and approve 
counsel. No substantive issue could be resolved prior to the appointment of an attorney. The 
prosecutor was entirely unable to move the case forward during this 26 day period; and if the 
twenty-six days are not considered, the mattei was concluded within 120 days. 
3. Capital cases require thorough investigation and preparation. A review of the 
Motions filed in this case is instructive as to the complicated issues which are typical of capital 
cases (see paragraphs 4, 11, 14, 15 ((pages 4-6)) above). While it may be possible to go 
through all of the proceedings necessary to bring a matter to trial within 120 days in most 
cases, One hundred and twenty days would not be adequate in many (if not most) capital 
cases. One hundred and twenty days is simply not enough time for counsel to investigate and 
properly prepare capital cases. On page three of Petitioner's Memorandum Mr. Wood reports 
10 
that when he requested counsel to file a Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Bugden "...said that they 
could not do Petitioner's case in 120 days..." This is a clear indication that Petitioner's 
counsel did not believe he could adequately prepare the case within 120 days. (Indeed, given 
the issues in this case and the opinion of Mr. Bugden, Mr. Bugden would have provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel if he would have attempted to try the case before he was able 
to provide a full defense on all issues). 
Based upon the facts and circumstances in this case the Court concludes that, even 
assuming the Petitioner's alleged facts, there was "good cause" under subsection (4) for the 
failure of the prosecutor to bring this matter to trial within 120 days. 
It is, therefore, clear that counsel was not ineffective in failing to file the Motion to 
Dismiss. Given Mr. Bugden's professional opinion that he could not prepare the case for trial 
within 120 days; it is clearly within the wide range of discretion allowed trial counsel in 
determining trial tactics to refuse to file a motion which would fail. In addition, by filing the 
motion, counsel would have introduced the 120 day issue into scheduling decision, which may 
have forced the trial to be scheduled prior to the time counsel was prepared to defend the 
Petitioner's life. Finally, because there was "good cause" for failing to bring the matter to 
trial within 120, the Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to file the Motion. 
IV: Speedy Trial - (Constitution) 
Although the Amended Petition claims the Petitioner's Constitutional Rights to a Speedy 
Trial were violated. The Petitioner does not allege any facts, analysis, or argument under the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial (Amendment VI of the United States Constitution). Nor 
does the Petitioner raise any facts, analysis, or argument pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-
6(f), which guarantees the right to a speedy trial afforded by the Utah Constitution, Instead, the 
Petitioner bases his claim upon UTAH CODE M . § 77-29-1 et. seq. In addition, on August 19, 
2002 the Defendant specifically waived his right to a speedy trial. The Motion is therefore 
granted as to the issue of whether the Petitioner was denied a speedy trial under the State and/or 
Federal Constitutions. 
The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
DATED this %C( day of February, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. LYNN PAY$E, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Addendum B 
UT ST § 77-29-1 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-29-1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
*M Chapter 29. Disposition of Detainers Against Prisoners 
-f§ 77-29-1. PrisonerTs demand for disposition of pending charge—Duties of 
custodial officer—Continuance may be granted—Dismissal of charge for failure 
to bring to trial 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, 
jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, 
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the 
nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought 
to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand described 
in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by personal 
delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate 
prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or custodial officer 
shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the attorney 
with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner 
as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open 
court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds 
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2. 
Jurisdiction Laws Effective Statutory Citation 
Date 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
UT ST § 77-29-1 Page 2 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-29-1 
Alabama 1978, No. 590 4-27-1978 Code 1975, §§ 15-9-80 to 15-9-88. 
Arizona 17 A.R.S. Rules of C r i m . P r o c , r u l e 
8 . 3 ( b ) . 
Colorado 1969, p. 291 10-1-1969 Westfs C.R.S.A. §§ 16-14-101 to 
16-14-108. 
Kansas 1970, c. 129 7-1-1970 K.S.A. 22-4301 to 22-4308. 
Minnesota 1967, c. 294 5-4-1967 M.S.A. § 629.292. 
Missouri 1959, H.B. 7-1-1971 V.A.M.S. §§ 217.450 to 217.485. 
259 
North Dakota .. 1971, c. 321 NDCC 29-33-01 to 29-33-08. 
Utah 1980, c. 15 7-1-1980 U.C.A.1953, §§ 77-29-1 to 77-29-4. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES • 
Uniform Law 
This section is similar to §§ 1 and 2 of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of 
Detainers Act. See Volume 11A Uniform Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA 
Database on Westlaw. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-29-1, UT ST § 77-29-1 
Current through end of 2005 First Special Session 
© 2005 Thomson/West 
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